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MEDIATED POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Barry Friedman*

I.

INTRODUCTION

There are divergent views in the legal academy concerning judicial
review, but at their core these views share a common (and possibly
flawed) premise. The premise is that the exercise of judicial review is
countermajoritarian in nature. There is a regrettable lack of clarity in
the relevant scholarship about what "countermajoritarian" actually
means.1 At bottom it often seems to be a claim, and perhaps must be a
claim,2 that when judges invalidate governmental decisions based upon
constitutional requirements, they act contrary to the preferences of
the citizenry.3 Some variation on this premise seems to drive most
normative scholarship regarding judicial review.4
Some scholars laud judicial review precisely because of its coun
termajoritarian character. Those of this view believe constitutional
*
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Chicago; J.D. 1982 Georgetown. - Ed. Many thanks to Rachel Barkow, Evan Caminker,
Michael Collins, Victor Ferreres, Laura Fitzgerald, Michael Gerhardt, Doni Gewirtzman,
Larry Kramer, Daryl Levinson, Terri Peretti, Eric Posner, Kenneth Pringle, Fred Schauer,
and Reva Siegel for comments on a prior draft of this Article, and to participants at a New
York University School of Law works-in-progress lunch. This piece is part of a larger project
with which I have received a great deal of help. Special mention is due to Greg Caldeira, Lee
Epstein, Lewis Kornhauser, and Larry Sager for their efforts along the way. My research
assistants did their usual excellent work; I thank Melissa Aoyagi, Harlan Cohen, and Julio
Rios-Figueroa. As always, thanks to Lisa Mihajlovic for the help. Finally, my gratitude to the
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patience with me while I fulfilled my obligations.

I. See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.

2. See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
3. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 ( 1962) ("The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter
majoritarian force in our system."). Numerous citations are provided in Barry Friedman,
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L.
RE V. 971, 972-83 (2000) [hereinafter Friedman, The Countermajoritarian Diffirnlty, Part
Four]. The lack of clarity includes the question of whether critics object to the substance of
judicial decisions (i.e., that they do not comport with outcomes the majority would prefer) or
the process of judicial decisionmaking (i.e., that judges are unaccountable in an electoral
sense). This question is taken up explicitly in infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
4. Collaboration of this point can be found in Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 333, 334-39 & nn. 1 & 4 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, The Countermajoritarian Diffi
culty, Part One].
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strictures exist to constrain the majority,5 that constitutional rights are
not to be subject to majority will. For those who hold this view, coun
termajoritarian judicial review is normatively desirable, although these
theorists may diverge when it comes to precisely how judicial power
should be exercised.
Other scholars criticize judicial review precisely because it inter
feres with the popular will.6 Under this view, representative govern
ment - such as what we enjoy in the United States - is intended to
reflect majority preferences. When judges invalidate government acts,
they inappropriately interfere with democracy.
Obviously, scholars on both sides of this divide usually are not, and
need not be, absolutists. One may applaud the judiciary's role in
limiting majority will in some instances, while believing it inappropri
ate in others. Similarly, one might think the judiciary often should
defer to popular preferences, but not always. The divergent
approaches express a mood,7 a sentiment about how judicial review
ought to operate in the main. And as might be expected, one's mood

5.

See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
(1980); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional In
terpretation, 1 10 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1380 (1997) (arguing that one of the reasons for a

REVIEW

Constitution and for judicial supremacy is "to remove a series of transcendent questions
from short-term majoritarian control"); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the
Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 556 (1998):
If one is bothered by the idea that judicial review entails a countermajoritarian or undemo
cratic type of decisionmaking, if one views this as deviant, troubling, or even "difficult" to
reconcile with one's vision of American government, then one has approached the question
with a presumption that majority rule is the starting point of inquiry. That presumption is
not j ustified by the text of the Constitution, nor has it been justified by extrinsic theoretical
arguments. Majority rule has a place under the Constitution, but that document does not
purport to elevate popular will to a position of even presumptive primacy. Indeed, popular
political will is a force to be tempered at every turn.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term - Foreword: The Vanishing Con103 H A RV. L. REV. 43, 47 (1989):

stitution,

Furthermore, decisionmaking by electorally accountable institutions should no longer be
presumed to be superior to that by the j udiciary; a far more sophisticated institutional analy
sis is required. Thus, at minimum, the justification offered by the Court that it is avoiding ju
dicial value imposition or that it is deferring to elected officials should not suffice to reject
constitutional claims.

6. The classic statement is Bickel's. See BICKEL, supra note 3, at 16 ( The root difficulty
is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system."); see also Suzanna
Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 611, 613 (1986) ("(W)hen the Court invalidates a statute, it is overturning the deci
sion of a popularly elected body; in essence it is enforcing its will over that of the elector
ate.").
"

7. Cf Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.) (ex
plaining that Congress, in the Administrative Procedures Act, expressed a "mood" about
judicial review).
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about judicial review often reflects what the judiciary presently is
doing.8
In the legal academy the view critical of judicial review is ascen
dant, often flying under the banner of "popular constitutionalism. "9
Because the idea of popular constitutionalism is (at least in its recent
appearance)10 a relatively new one, the particulars have not been
worked out. Different scholars, whether using the phrase explicitly or
not, likely have differing views of what it does or should mean. Most
proponents of the idea do not question the legitimacy of judicial
review. But what they seem to share is a notion that - at least in
specified circumstances - judicial review should mirror popular views
about constitutional meaning.11
This Article discusses the relationship between popular opinion
and constitutional law. The Article rests heavily on research in the
social sciences that suggests there is substantial congruity between
popular opinion and the decisions of constitutional judges, as well as
other research that indicates popular support for the practice of judi
cial review. In light of this research, the Article suggests that popular
constitutionalists may be getting what they want, albeit not in the
8. See Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Scholarship, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming 2004) (hereinafter Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Scholarship]
(discussing how judicial activity influences academic perspectives).
9. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term - Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 163 (2001) ("Popular constitutionalism is not some quaint curiosity from
the Founders' world. It is a vital principle that has been part of our constitutional tradition
all along."); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1 102 (2001):
According to our theory of partisan entrenchment, each party has the political "right" to en
trench its vision of the Constitution in the judiciary if it wins a sufficient number of elections.
If others don't like the constitutional vision that results, they have the equal right to go out
and win some elections of their own.
10. Larry Kramer describes the historical roots of the idea in a Harvard Law Review
Foreword, see Kramer, supra note 9, and a forthcoming book. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (forthcom
ing 2004).
1 1. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AwAy FROM THE COURTS
194 (1999) ("[T]he public generally should participate in shaping constitutional law more :
directly . . . (and] reclaim (the Constitution] from the courts."); Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial
Supremacy and Equal Protection in a Democracy of Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281, 295
(2002) ("When all three branches of government are in the business of protecting constitu�
tional rights, the vocabulary of the 'countermajoritarian difficulty,' with its contrast between
majoritarian legislatures and a minoritarian Court, no longer makes sense."); Kramer, supra
note 9, at 12 ( [I]t was the people themselves - working through or responding to their
agents in the government - who were responsible for seeing that the Constitution was
properly interpreted and implemented. The idea of turning this responsibility over to judges
was unthinkable."); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal An
tidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 444 (2000) ("We
question the court-centered model of constitutional interpretation that these decisions as�
sume, examining the relationship between Court and Congress that actually shaped the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in recent decades. We argue that this history justi
fies a continuing role for democratic vindication of equality values.").
"
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precise form in which they ask for it. Similarly, it explains that the core
premise of much legal scholarship - that judicial review is counter
majoritarian - may well be wrong.
The animating idea of the Article is that our system is one of
popular constitutionalism, in that judicial interpretations of the
Constitution reflect popular will over time. But the relationship is not
direct, and does not involve judges simply deferring to popular will in
certain instances, as some popular constitutionalists seem to believe
should be the case. Rather, the process is mediated by the ways that
the public gets its information about what courts do, the way the pub
lic can and does respond to judicial decisions, and the extent to which
courts are cognizant of popular opinion and take account of it.
Although the Article takes a firm view that as a descriptive matter
there is a relationship between popular opinion and judicial review that we have a system of mediated popular constitutionalism - the
broader point is that there is much we do not understand about this
system and how it operates. Social science has a great deal to teach us
on this score, in a body of work that has received little notice by the
legal academy. But that literature raises as many questions as it
answers. In a sense then, this Article maps out a research agenda,
directing attention to what we must learn in order to understand
better the relationship between popular opinion and constitutional
law.
Part II of the Article offers an understanding of constitutionalism
and judicial review that rests upon popular acquiescence, and is more
strongly tied to democratic electoral processes than most legal scholars
acknowledge or believe to be the case. While only a sketch, Part II
begins to provide a normative justification for the practice of judicial
review. This theory is one of "popular constitutionalism" because if it
is operating as posited, judicial outputs should not be greatly out of
line with popular preferences, and the public generally should be sup
portive of the process of constitutional adjudication. On the other
hand, this popular constitutionalism necessarily is "mediated" by
notable aspects of our system, such as unelected judges, a not-always
well-informed public, and representatives who may or may not do the
public's bidding. The mediated nature of judicial review is a good
thing, because the normative role of judicial review requires that con
stitutional adjudication not be as immediately responsive to popular
will as are other aspects of our system.
Part III explores one central part of the concept of mediated
popular constitutionalism, the extent to which the public can and does
serve as a monitor of judicial activity. Public monitoring of the judici
ary, and judicial responsiveness to public opinion over time, are essen
tial to mediated popular constitutionalism. But under almost any
normative theory of judicial review, the trick is striking a balance
between too little and too much judicial responsiveness to public
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opinion. The bulk of the Article explores what we know about the
extent to which the public can and does monitor its judicial agents.
The focus of Part III is on the social science concept of "diffuse"
support: that the public will support the j udiciary even if it disagrees
with specific decisions. Evaluating how this theory operates in practice
requires an examination of how the public receives information about
judicial review, and how that information influences public opinion.
Among social scientists, evaluating the relationship between public
support and judicial review has posed a complicated and difficult set
of questions to answer. But what we know suggests that we may
indeed have a system of mediated popular constitutionalism, albeit an
imperfect one.
Part IV compares the information provided by social scientists
about popular attitudes toward judicial review with normative claims
about the practice. The information that we possess suggests that the
actual practice of judicial review is quite different than normative
scholars paint it. This Part discusses in broad brush how theories of
judicial review fare in light of what we know. It then takes up what
ultimately may be the most interesting question: the extent to which
public opinion can be manipulated by various actors, thereby influ
encing attitudes toward judicial review, and perhaps the outputs of the
courts as well.
II.

THE JUDICIARY OF POPULAR ACQUIESCENCE

This is a sketch of a theory of constitutionalism that does not rest
on the assumption that judicial review is contrary to popular will. The
theory is as responsive as it is affirmative, meaning that it is designed .
to call into question normative theories of judicial review that rest
heavily on the countermajoritarian premise. For example, if judicial
review is not regularly countermajoritarian, then those who expect
constitutional courts to play the role of rights defenders against
majority sentiment may have to adjust their theories. They will have to
ask what expectations of constitutional judges are reasonable, or
under what conditions rights are protected given majority preferences ..
They may have to seek widespread institutional reform. Similarly,
those who complain about the inconsistency between judicial output
and popular will may have to revise the basis for their complaints.
They may need to consider the possibility that it is their own views
(and not those of constitutional judges) that are out of step with
popular preferences, or to determine why the public is not getting the
right message about what the Supreme Court is doing.
Within this largely responsive theory, however, rests the begin
nings of a more affirmative, normative theory of constitutional and
judicial review. If the judiciary is not regularly or commonly outside
the run of popular opinion, then all existing theories of judicial review

·

·

·

·

August 2003)

Mediated Popular Constitutionalism

2601

are in a sense problematic. The question becomes, is there a theory of
judicial review that rests more firmly on the evidence at hand about
how the practice actually operates? And is the theory normatively
appealing?
Following recent scholarship, such a theory might be called "medi
ated popular constitutionalism. " Some scholars are of the view that
constitutional meaning should be rooted more deeply in popular
understandings.12 But there necessarily are bounds to such a claim; it
cannot help but bump up against notions of constitutionalism and of
the practice of judicial review. Surely the Constitution cannot mean
whatever the present majority happens to think it should mean, for
then constitutionalism would bleed entirely into "normal politics."13
The populace does not typically express its desires in terms of what
the Constitution should mean, but what it wants at present. This is not
to say the people are incapable of distinguishing between immediate
preferences and constitutional limitations, only that the mechanisms of
ordinary politics do not often ask them to make this distinction. In
addition, when present preferences collide with constitutional limita
tions, the tension between the two tends to distort the latter. Thus,
even popular constitutionalism must be a search for some deeper set
of limiting principles with which the population over time is willing
to live,14 constraints that on sober reflection and at a proper level of
generality are those that achieve widespread acceptance.15 Because
12. See Neal Kumar Katya!, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335,
1336 (2001) ("My conclusion is that because of its unique institutional features, Congress
should interpret the text in ways the courts should not. For example, I suggest that Congress
should take popular values and beliefs into account when formulating constitutional princi
ples."); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 302 (discussing "the role of social movements in shaping
constitutional meaning in a different framework");· supra note 1 1 .
13. This claim i s developed a t length i n Barry Friedman & Scott B . Smith, The Sedi
mentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998). But see KRAMER, supra note 10, at 73-84
(forthcoming 2004) (arguing this is the way popular constitutionalism has operated through
out history). The phrase "normal politics" or "normal lawmaking" is what Bruce Ackerman
uses to distinguish everyday political activity from the special moments of "higher" constitu
tional lawmaking. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6, 266 (1991).
14. See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 1 03 YALE L.J. 177, 180 (1993):
I argue that the Constitution should be viewed as part of a body of tradition that can teach
present and future generations the principles that will allow society not merely to change,
but to mature - to develop a certain degree of autonomy and capacity for independent
judgment while still appreciating the value to be gained from the wisdom and experiences of
prior generations.
Friedman & Smith, supra 13, at 7 ("The role of the constitutional interpreter is to recon
cile our deepest constitutional commitments, revealed by all of our constitutional history,
with today's preferences."). See generally Larry Kramer, Fidelity 'to History - and Through
It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627 (1997).
15. Responding to the countermajoritarian problem, some writers have argued that ju
dicial review might be understood as a technique for remanding a question for reconsidera
tion by the people: an appeal from John drunk to John sober. See Mark V. Tushnet, Justice
Brennan, Equality, and Majority Rule, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1357, 1369-70 (1991); see also
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popular constitutionalists rarely recommend abolishing judicial review
altogether, so it must serve a. function other than rubber-stamping
immediate popular preferences.
Under a regime of mediated popular constitutionalism, the j udici
ary plays an important role in identifying those constitutional values
that achieve widespread popular support over time.16 This is not an
exclusively judicial role, but given the functions performed by the
different branches this task falls largely on the judiciary. After all, the
more political branches are assigned to enact and fulfill popular
desires. Judges, on the other hand, say no (and yes) to the acts of the
popular branches, based on judicial interpretation of constitutional
requirements. In exercising the power of judicial review, judges rely
(or should rely) upon society's deeply held, longstanding values when
they trump the immediate acts of other governmental actors.
But what those who complain about judicial review often miss is
that consistent with the concept of popular constitutionalism, the judi
cial veto necessarily must fall within a range acceptable to popular
judgment over time. Judicial decisions need not be instantly popular
or accepted; that is just one way in which popular constitutionalism is
"mediated." Sorting immediate preferences from longstanding and
deeply held constitutional views may take some time. The question is
whether on reflection a judicial decision will win popular acceptance.
What follows is a sketch of such a system of judicial review, based
not in jurisprudence, but in the theory and empiricism of social
science. The sketch has a purpose: to set the stage to address one of
mediated popular constitutionalism's more problematic aspects, the
question of whether public attention to the work of the judiciary likely
will succeed in achieving the underlying premises of the system. In
other words, does mediated popular constitutionalism strike an
appropriate balance between judicial accountability over the long run
and the immediate triumph of popular opinion? The remainder of the
paper explores this problem in depth.
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 678 (1991) [hereinaf
ter Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review] (referring to "appeal from John drunk to John
sober"). In that form, the defense of judicial review is incomplete. Suppose, after the re
mand, the people decided that they really did want the statute the Court held unconstitu
tional. The Court might say, "Well, if that's what you really want, we'll let you do it. The
statute is no longer unconstitutional, even though it was when we first considered the case."
But, the response might also be to frustrate sustained majority will.
As to levels of generality, see Michael H. v. Gerald D. , 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989)
(Scalia & Rehnquist, JJ.) ("We refer to the most specific level [of generality) at which a rele
vant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.");
Lawrence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend
the Future- or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 180 (discussing
"Justice Scalia's contention that rights unearthed through an examination of our traditions
are to be defined at the greatest level of specificity possible").
16. For an elaboration of this point, see Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Posi
tive: The Nature and Function ofJudicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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The Countermajoritarian Problem Critiqued

Because this is a responsive theory, it is useful to explain what it is
developed against. It writes against a long tradition of claiming that
for better or for worse judicial review is countermajoritarian.17 The
"for better or for worse" question is itself problematic - progressives
and conservatives tend to switch sides depending on what courts are
doing18 - but both positions implicate the countermajoritarian asser
tion.
It is extremely important to understand what the countermajori
tarian claim actually is. This is because constitutional theorists may say
that empirical evidence regarding the relationship between popular
opinion and judicial review is irrelevant to their project. They may
argue that they are, as a matter of political philosophy, trying to
address the legitimacy of judicial review. They may insist that whether
the public agrees with judicial decisions, or likes judicial review, has
nothing to do with the legitimacy of the practice.
At some point, however, philosophical claims must meet empirical
evidence head on. Elusiveness as to what precisely is the counterma
joritarian objection makes this difficult. But under any plausible
description, the relationship between public opinion and judicial
review must have some bearing on the countermajoritarian claim.
Judicial review might be problematic because judges are not elec
torally accountable, as are the other branches. 1 9 It seems at times this is
the basis for complaint, but if so, it is an exceedingly odd one. After

17. See supra notes 1 -6 and accompanying text.
18. See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Fried
man, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five]; Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional
Scholarship, supra note 8.
19. See ELY, supra note 5, at 4-5 (stating what he considers the "central problem, of ju
dicial review: a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant
way is telling the people's elected representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like"). A
related problem with such theories is that they too readily assume that the work of constitu
tional j udging primarily involves striking down laws enacted by elective assemblies, when in
fact most constitutional cases deal with the activity of relatively unaccountable administra
tive officials, such as low-level police officials. See, e.g. , Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint
in the A dministrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
759, 762 (1997) ("Judicial review is not the practice of invalidating statutes. Nor is it a prac
tice exemplified by the invalidation of statutes. Rather, judicial review is, at a minimum, the
practice of invalidating (state and federal) statutes, rules, orders and official actions on direct
constitutional grounds."); Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A
Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 427 (1997) ("In fact,
the federal courts most often enforce constitutional norms against administrative agencies
and street-level bureaucrats, and the norms are enforced not by the Supreme Court but by
the federal trial courts.") Of course, these officials may be accountable (or responsive) to
public opinion in ways other than through election. But if this satisfies democratic theory,
then election vel non ought not to be the question regarding j udges.
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all, federal judges never were electorally accountable.20 Thus, one
must follow the logic of this complaint to the conclusion that either the
system for selecting federal judges must be changed, or the practice of
judicial review must be eliminated. Yet one rarely hears either claim
in so clear a form. In addition, many state and local judges also
possessing the power of judicial review - complete power, in fact, to
interpret state constitutions - are elected. Even rarer is the claim that
such electoral systems are preferential to the federal system. There.
may be a better selection system than the federal one, and it might
involve electoral elements, but the existing state selection systems are
commonly considered objects of woe.2 1 Empirical evidence about
popular opinion may be irrelevant to a claim that judicial review is
problematic because judges are not elected; but if this is the claim, one
must be prepared to attack the problem at its root. And to the extent
the claim is that elected representatives are relatively more account
able to popular preferences, that seems once again to be an empirical
question.22
Alternatively, the claim might be that judicial review is problem
atic because it invalidates laws enacted on behalf of the people by
their elected representatives.23 This sort of claim squares more com
fortably with the sorts of remedies proposed to address supposedly
20. U.S. CONST. art I l l, § 1 ("The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall
hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services,
a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.").
21. See, e.g., Mark A Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting A ppointive
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 273
(2002); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43 (2003); see
also St:::ven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995).
22. The claim might be that public officials are relatively more accountable than consti
tutional judges, or that it is easier to correct errors of other officials than it is to correct
j udges' constitutional decisions. If these are the claims, it is worthy of note that they are
highly empirical, and most scholarship in the field makes no attempt to resolve them on this
basis. This is a fruitful area for further study, but three things might be said at this juncture.
First, not all public officials are electorally accountable, and if some other form of account
ability is the issue then it would take sensitive study to figure out whether judges are more or
less accountable than these other officials. See supra note 19 (discussing unelected public
officials). Second, unpopular judicial decisions do get overturned; the claim here is specifi
cally that congruence typically is achieved between popular opinion and judicial outcomes.
See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text. Whether overturning judicial decisions is more
difficult than defeating legislative inertia or interest-group pressure, both of which might
defeat popular opinion, is difficult to say absent comparative study. Finally, studies measur
ing government responsiveness to public opinion tend to show the j udiciary is at least
as responsive as other governmental entities. See Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of
Alexander Bicke/'s The Least Dangerous Branch, in ALEXANDER BICKEL AND
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Kenneth Ward ed., forthcoming 2004)
(summarizing the literature on opinion-policy responsiveness).
23. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 16-17 (arguing that "when the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a legislative act or . the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of
the prevailing majority, but against it").
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close countermajoritarian judicial review, which typically involve
theories of constitutional interpretation, not judicial selection. Some
commentators suggest that j udges defer more to the judgments of
elected representatives.24 Others advance interpretive theories that
ostensibly would square the practice of j udicial review with democratic
government.25
B ut even this claim - that it is problematic when judges trump the
decisions of elected officials - has a confusion that requires identifi
cation, if not resolution. The confusion is whether the complaint is that
j udges are striking down duly enacted laws, or are interfering with
majority preference. The two are not necessarily the same. Though
jurisprudential theory often avoids this messy fact, duly enacted laws
do not always carry with them popular support.26 It is thus incumbent
upon the complainants to specify which of the two is problematic.27
If j udges are striking down unpopular laws, the countermajori
tarian objection is at least a little difficult to understand. Relying on
a theory of deliberative democracy, one could argue that insulated
representatives not mirroring constituent preferences should be
favored over judges who do represent popular preference, but this is
not an argument that one hears often (if at all). Nor is it easy to see
the normative appeal of favoring elected representatives who deviate
from popular will over judges who act consistently with popular will.
Ultimately, the claim (and the fear) must be that judges strike
down popular laws. And this, as we will see, is a highly dubious claim.
Judges who strike down popular laws ultimately will run into trouble.
On the other hand, judicial review is unlikely to be threatened when
judges act contrary to the will of elected officials, but consistently with
popular opinion.
Even if the public does not approve of all judicial decisions,
the system of judicial review itself still may find widespread popular

24. This is the view commonly attributed to Thayer, which raises an immediate problem
because Thayer himself only would apply his rule of deference to congressional judgments.
Yet members of state legislators are elected officials also. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
Learned Hand: The Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 873,
886 (1995) (book review). Today arguments in favor of deference are being heard fre
quently. See supra notes 12-15.
25. For examples of such theories, see generally ACKERMAN, supra note 13; RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF
GOVERNMENT (2001); ELY, supra note 5.
26. Some of the vast literature on this point is reviewed in Friedman, Dialogue and Judi
cial Review, supra note 15, at 638-41.
27. I n addition, those who challenge judicial. review focus too closely on the work of the
Supreme Court, and fail to address the merit of j udicial review in many ordinary cases by
lower courts. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review?, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1416, 1424 (2000) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Losing Faith) ("Focusing exclu
sively on the high Court ignores the huge quantity of lower-court decisions enforcing the
Constitution.") (critiquing TUSHNET, supra note 1 1).
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support. Stated differently, the public itself might favor a system in
which their judges sometimes trump the public's immediate prefer
ences. It is highly unlikely the public would sustain a system in which
judges only, or even usually, struck down popular laws. But the public
may well support a system that gives it what it wants much of the time,
even if not all the time. And the public might applaud a system that
sometimes deprives it of immediate preferences, in the name of other
deeply held values.
B.

Popular Constitutionalism, Sketched

The idea of mediated popular constitutionalism rests on three
assumptions. The first is that judicial decisions rest within a range of
acceptability to a majority of the people. The second assumption is
that even when the public disagrees with some decisions, it nonethe
less supports the practice of judicial review. The third is that if the
people were discontent with judicial review and its outputs, they could
take action.
There is plenty of evidence that the first assumption is true.
Although the modeling is not perfect, and the empirical tests have
their failings, the wealth of existing evidence suggests that most of the
time judicial decisions fall within the range of acceptability that one
might expect of the agents of popular government.28 Social scientists
pursue basically two sorts of studies of the consistency between popu
lar opinion and judicial decisions. One type of research pairs polling
results about substantive policy with Supreme Court output.29 Thus, a
poll asking popular views of abortion might be compared to Supreme
Court decisions in the area.30 These studies suffer from a failure to
conduct a sustained project in which polls regularly are devised to mir
ror the Supreme Court's agenda.31 Yet, there are enough data points
28. See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
29. See JONATHAN D. CASPER, THE POLITICS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (1972) (comparing
the Supreme Court's civil rights, national security, and criminal rights decisions with public
opinion polls); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 2
(1 989) (examining nearly 150 nationwide polls and corresponding Court decisions since the
mid-1930s); ROBERT WEISSBERG, PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1976)
(comparing the Court's rulings and opinion polls in school integration, death penalty, and
school prayer cases); David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial
Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 654-64 (1985) (focusing on the
relationship between the policy preferences of the Supreme Court and those of the
American public on selected issues of public policy, such as birth control, interracial mar
riage, women's role, and abortion, in the post-New Deal period).
30. See Judith Blake, The Abortion Decisions: Judicial Review and Public Opinion, in
ABORTION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES 51-82 (Edward Manier et al. eds.,
1 977); John E. Jackson & Maris Vinovskis, Public Opinion, Elections, and the 'Single Issue'
Issue, in THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 64-81 (Gilbert Steiner ed.,
1984).
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to reach the conclusion that in the main the results of Supreme Court
decisionmaking comport with the preferences of a majority or at least
a strong plurality, something that many political scientists now take as
a given.32 Polls at least test many high-profile cases,33 which presuma
bly are the ones the public cares most about, although this may be a
failing if one cares about public sentiment regarding the full run of ju
dicial decisionmaking. Moreover, as other studies suggest, if there is a
divergence, time - and not too long a time - usually serves to ensure
that the Court bows to public opinion, or confirms that public opinion
was moving in the same direction as the Court's decisions.34
Another set of studies compare the liberalism or conservativism of
Supreme Court decisions with a barometer of public liberalism or

31. Moreover, many studies only look at the consistency between public opinion and a
single case or issue. See MARSHALL, supra note 29, at 71 ("The available studies are also
limited because they chiefly report single case studies.").
32. CASPER, supra note 29 (finding that in civil rights, and national security cases the
Court's decisions reflected more closely public opinion than criminal rights decisions);
MARSHALL, supra note 29, at 97 ("The results suggest that since the mid-1930s the Supreme
Court has been an essentially majoritarian institution in American Politics. When a clear poll
majority or plurality exists, over three fifths of the Court's decisions reflect the polls.");
TERRY J. PEREITI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 177 (1999) ("[T]he Court does not
always issue unpopular decisions or play an unpopular role . . . . [A]s several studies have
proven, the Court does not exclusively or persistently act in opposition to public opinion or
the will of representative bodies."); WEISSBERG, supra note 29 (finding the Court agreed
more frequently with public opinion in school integration, and death penalty cases than in
school prayer cases); Barnum, supra note 29, at 662 ("Viewed in the context of nationwide
trends in public opinion . . . the judicial activism of the post New-Deal Supreme Court was in
fact surprisingly consistent with majoritarian principles."); see also James Bryce, Flexible and
Rigid Constitutions, in 1 STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 197 (1901):
(E] xperience has shown that where public opinion sets strongly in favor of the line of con
duct which the Legislature has followed in stretching the Constitution, the Courts are them
selves affected by that opinion, and go as far as their legal conscience and the general sense
of the legal profession permit - possibly sometimes a little bit farther - in holding valid
what the Legislature has done.
33. MARSHALL, supra note 29, at 72-74 ("Major polling organizations are usually tied to
newspapers or television stations, and the polls focus heavily on timely controversies. As a
result, topics of greater public interest - such as civil liberties, civil rights, national security,
labor, privacy, or religion cases - are over represented.").
34. Barnum, supra note 29, at 664 (describing the interdependence of the relationship
between the Supreme Court's decisions and public opinion through time, highlighting the
impact of the Supreme Court's decisions on bridging the gap when national and state public
opinion diverge); William Mishler & Reginald Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal
Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. 'POL. 169,
196-98 (1996) [hereinafter Mishler & Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and
Supreme Court Decision Making] (finding a five-year lag in some Supreme Court justices'
response to public opinion); William Mishler & Reginald Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 (1993) [hereinafter Mishler & Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution?] (finding a lag of five to seven years in Supreme Court re
sponsiveness to public opinion); see also Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) ("The fact is,
then, that the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the
policy views dominant among lawmaking majorities of the United States.").
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conservativism.35 These studies are extremely complicated methodol
ogically, and reliance on any one of them alone might be a bad idea.
But no matter how the problem is tackled, the result is roughly the
same: mood swings in the general public are mirrored in the output of
the Supreme Court.36
Of course, there is not perfect congruence between public opinion
and judicial decisions, which brings to the fore the second assumption.
Clearly there are areas - flag burning and school prayer come to
mind - in which the public appears to disapprove of constitutional
decisions. But even given these areas, there is no hue and cry to elimi
nate judicial review.
This necessarily brings us to the final assumption - the more diffi
cult one to test - which is the existence of some mechanism of popu
lar control that accounts for the congruence of popular preferences
and judicial outcomes. This assumption is important because the idea
of mediated popular constitutionalism assumes that should judicial
decisions diverge from popular preference in some significant way, or
should the public wish to eliminate or modify the practice of judicial
review, there is a means to correct the process. It is, however, worth
observing that the fact of convergence between popular opinion and
judicial outputs on high-salience issues is evidence alone that such a

35. See Roy B. Fleming & Dan B. Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual
Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 492-95 (1997); Mish
ler & Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution?, supra note 34;
James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543, 555-56 (1995);
Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evi
dence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences (2000) (unpublished manu
script at 13-14, on file with author), available at http://www.unc.edu/-jstimson/papers.htm.
See generally JAMES A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA: MOODS, CYCLES, AND
SWINGS (2d ed. 1999) (explaining creation of the index of American Public Mood that is the
basis for many studies that explore the relation between liberalism in public opinion and lib
eral decisions by the Supreme Court).
36. See Fleming & Wood, supra note 35, at 468 (finding strong support for the direct
impact of liberalism in the public mood on the liberal proportion of decisions made by each
individual Supreme Court justice); McGuire & Stimson, supra note 35 (finding strong sup
port for the direct impact of liberalism in the public mood on the liberal proportion of deci
sions made by the Supreme Court); Mishler & Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal
Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making, supra note 34, at 169 (finding strong support
for the direct impact of liberalism in the public mood on the liberal proportion of decisions
made by some individual Supreme Court justices at a lag of five years); Stimson et al., Dy
namic Representation, supra note 35, at 543 (finding that Supreme Court decisions reflect the
degree of liberalism in public mood but to a lesser degree than the other branches of gov
ernment); see also William Mishler & Reginald Sheehan, Popular Influence on Supreme
Court Decisions: A Response, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711, 716-22 (1 994); William Mishler &
Reginald Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution?, supra note 34,
at 87 (finding support for indirect impact of public opinion on Supreme Court, via the nomi
nation-confirmation process, and for direct impact of public opinion liberalism on Supreme
Court decisions but at a lag of five years); Jeffrey Segal & Helmut Norpoth, Popular Influ
ence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711, 716 (1994) (finding support
for indirect impact of public opinion on Supreme Court, via the nomination-confirmation
process, and not of direct impact of public opinion liberalism on Supreme Court decisions).
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mechanism exists. It would be an awfully large and felicitous coinci
dence to find such convergence in the absence of a coordination
mechanism.
Although it may be hard to specify the mechanism precisely, there
are several possibilities. One possible mechanism is the appointment
process. As scholars in both political science and law have observed,
the process of periodic appointments to the judiciary, and particularly
to the Supreme Court, ensures some congruity between popular
opinion and judicial output.37 Presidents, themselves subject to popu
lar influence, appoint people whose views are congenial, and who can
survive the confirmation process. Some studies suggest this is the
primary means by which popular influence is felt on the Supreme
Court.38
Despite the obviousness of this mechanism it is not without diffi
culty. Two points make this apparent. First, the mechanism rests on its
own assumption that presidents appoint justices (and j udges) whose
views are in the mainstream of popular opinion. Yet, the evidence on
this is hardly overwhelming. Historical study suggests presidential
practices have varied.39 Even when politics motivates presidents, judi37. MARSHALL, supra note 29, at 20 (evaluating the appointment process as a link
between public opinion and the Supreme Court); PERETT I, supra note 32, at 100:
Supreme Court justices are selected by the president and Senate primarily because of their
partisan loyalties and political beliefs. Thus. the values held by the justices and represented
on the Court are highly likely to reflect the values currently, or at a minimum recently.
dominant in the society and in the government.
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9; Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court 1998 Term Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration,
113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 65-67 (1999); Charles Cameron, Albert D. Cover, and Jeffrey Segal,
Supreme Court Nominations and the Rational Presidency (paper presented at the annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1 990, on file with author) (showing
that one basis for a president to choose a Supreme Court Justice is to maximize popularity).
The authors identified in note 36, supra, also evaluate the indirect impact of public opinion
on Supreme Court decisions through the nomination-confirmation process vis-a-vis the di
rect impact of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions. Their findings reflect a combina
tion of direct and indirect impacts of public opinion on Supreme Court's decisionmaking.
38. See, e.g. , Mishler & Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institu
tion?, supra note 34, (finding that Court's decisions followed the public mood, after a brief
time lag, from 1956 to 1 981; and suggesting the key explanation was the politically motivated
use of the appointment process); Segal & Norpoth, supra note 36, at 716 ("While justices are
not accountable to the populace, presidents and senators. who share the power to choose
them, are. Whatever configuration of public opinion elects a president, in particular, could
transpire in his or her Court appointments. . . . It is not that the j ustices pay keen attention to
public opinion but that they have been chosen by a president (with the advice and consent of
the Senate) who presumably shares the pubiic's views.").
39. PERETTI, supra note 32, at 86-87:
Presidents have, of course, varied in the emphasis they place on particular criteria. For ex
ample, Truman was especially prone to "crony" appointments, emphasizing personal friend
ship and political loyalty over ideology per se. President Ford, similarly to Eisenhower,
placed a premium on professional considerations . . . Carter's . . . goal [was described] as
'merit selection among democrats.' Nominees' policy views were critical in the judicial ap
pointment decisions of FDR, Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan.
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cial appointments can and are used to appease numerous constituen
cies, including those that may well fall outside the mainstream.
Recently, for example, Republican presidents have searched for
judges of a strong conservative ideology, so much so that they may
well be out of the center of public opinion.40 Second, judges and
justices serve a long time. Issues and politics change around them. It is
not at all clear why this aggregation of the views of justices appointed
over a long period of time necessarily mirrors public opinion. This '
mechanism might accomplish the task, but no in-depth study has made
an airtight case that it does.
Another way to think about the mechanism that assures congruity
between judicial decisions and popular opinion is to look at incentives.
Do judges have the incentive to see that their decisions retain some
consistency with popular opinion? If they have this incentive, then we
might expect such outcomes, so long as there is some way the judges
could pull this off. As we will see, this question of incentive and how
judges accomplish it plays an important role in the ability of the public
to monitor judicial behavior.
The question of incentive appears a fairly easy one. For all the talk
of a countermajoritarian judiciary, judges need the people. First,
popular opinion is the key to surviving any possible attacks by the
political branches.41 Actors in the political branches have challenged,
DAYID A. YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999) (drawing on the papers of seven presi
dents, from Truman to Reagan, to show that some presidents - Truman, Kennedy, and
Johnson - choose candidates with little or no idea of how they might one day vote as jus
tices, while other executives, including Nixon and Reagan, often settled on candidates in the
face of considerable evidence that they might vote contrary to their wishes); see also HENRY
J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO
THE SUPREME COURT (1985).
40. PERETTI, supra note 32, at 87 ("Similar to Reagan's, President Bush's appointees
were overwhelmingly Republicans possessing a conservative judicial philosophy, a majority
of whom had a history of political activism.").
41. Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confi
dence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209 (1986) (suggesting that judiciary's
backing force is public support); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic Na
tional Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 584-85 (2001); Georg Vanberg, Legislative-Judicial
Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 346,
351-52, (2001 ) ("The idea is that supportive publics can help enforce judicial decisions via an
implicit threat of a political backlash in response to instances of public authority defiance or
delay in implementation."); Jeffrey K. Staton & Mark Strahan, The Emergence of an Effec
tive Constitutional Court 3 (Sept. 20, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(arguing that public support is a key element that explains the emergence of an effective
constitutional court); Andrew D. Martin, Public Policy, the Supreme Court, and the Separa
tion of Powers 21 (Aug. 4, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("(T]he
branch that Alexander Hamilton described as the 'weakest' has policy making power only
because of public respect and support. Just as justices are savvy policy seekers, it is reason
able to assert that the justices are mindful of the legitimacy of the Court when making deci
sions"); Andrew D. Martin, Statutory Battles and Constitutional Wars: Congress and the
Supreme Court 12 (Oct. 26, 2001 ) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("[T]he jus
tice's ability to achieve their policy goals hinges on their legitimacy.").
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and will continue to challenge, judicial authority or independence
when it serves their interests.42 Whether those attacks succeed depends
on how the public views the attacks. There is historical evidence that
popular opinion can protect a judiciary under siege. The most familiar
example of this is the failure of Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan,43 but it is not the only example. It is quite likely that public
opinion served as a safeguard of judicial independence at critical
moments during Reconstruction,44 and there are similar stories from
other countries with constitutional courts.45
Judges also need popular opinion to see that their decisions are
enforced. It is a fair assumption that judges care about the judgments

42. Barry Friedman, "Things Forgotten " in the Debate over Judicial Independence, 14
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1998). We are familiar with examples regarding federal courts, but
this is true in states as well. See Kramer, supra note 9, at 57-58 (noting that in the Rhode Is
land case of Trevett v. Weeden, "[a)lthough the judges had neither declared the law unconsti
tutional nor even stated forthrightly that they had the power to do so, the governor con
vened a special meeting of the legislature, which summoned the court to explain its action,"
and when the court did not provide a satisfactory explanation, the "assembly . . . entertained
a motion to dismiss the entire bench"); Theodore W. Ruger, "A Question Which Convulses a
Nation ": The Early Republic's Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 1 17 HARV.
L. REV. 826 (2004); see also Kramer, supra note 9, at 56 (describing other "early efforts to
exercise judicial review [that) tended to draw stinging rebukes," such as Rutgers v. Wad
dington (New York), and a New Hampshire case where the state court refused to implement
a law eliminating trial by jury in cases involving less than ten pounds).
43. This argument is developed in Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Four, supra note 3, at 1057 (noting that there appears to be a "basis for con
cluding that had the Court not shifted in the eyes of the public, some retributive action
would have been possible. Public sentiment against the Court was strong, and Roosevelt's
case would have been bolstered by a bad economy and additional unpopular judicial deci
sions."). See generally JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938);
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995). But see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING
THE NEW DEAL COURT 12-13, 25 (1998) (noting that the court-packing plan faced early, or
ganized opposition and that reasons to doubt the success of the plan provided the justices
with "ample reason to be confident that constitutional capitulation was not necessary to
avert the Court-packing threat").
44. This point is made at great length in Barry Friedman, The History of the Counter
majoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction 's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 47 (2002)
[hereinafter Friedman, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II] ("Events [during Recon
struction] suggest that there was diffuse support for the Court, and that at least up to a cer
tain limit, the public was reluctant to see action taken against it. Although that reluctance
obviously did not foreclose some action against the Court, it might have moderated the ac
tion that was taken."); see also id. at 63 (noting with respect to Court-packing and jurisdic
tion-stripping measures, there was "initial public acceptance of the idea of political control
of the judiciary, followed by apparent exercise of that control at a critical moment, eventu
ally resulting in public shame over the action and its appearance of conflict with notions of
rule of law").
45. For an interesting case regarding Konrad Adenauer and the German Constitutional
Court, see Georg Vanberg, Establishing Judicial Independence in Germany: The Impact of
Opinion Leadership and the Separation of Powers, 32 COMP. POL. 333 (2000). See also
JENNIFER A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW 23-24 (2001) (describing how Zim
babwean citizens "took to the streets" to protest military action in defiance of court order).
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they render and prefer those judgments not fall on deaf ears.46
Enforcement of judicial decisions typically does not rest on the public
so much as upon public officials. But sometimes public sentiment itself
matters, as is evident from the widespread defiance engendered by the
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.41 And even when enforce
ment is up to public officials, the action they choose to take may again
be a function of public pressure.
Given the incentive judges face to remain within the range of
public opinion, it takes no large step to see that they can ensure their
decisions do not stray too far outside the mainstream. There certainly
is evidence that in high-profile cases judges have taken such care.48
Judges do not live in a cocoon; they are of this world. It is not credible
to think that judges lack information about the way their judgments
might be received.49 Of course, the more divided the polity, the more
46. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL B EHAVIOR 55 (2000) ("Students of
the Court generally assume that justices act to advance their conceptions of good law or
good policy, and supporting that assumption are strong theoretical arguments and consider
able empirical evidence."); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995) (discussing the
different sources of motivations for j udges, among them the importance of practical conse
quences of decisions); JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (explaining attitudinal model presumes that
each member of the Supreme Court has preferences concerning the policy questions faced
by the Court: when the Justices make decisions they want the outcomes to approximate as
nearly as possible to those policy preferences); see also Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D . Cover,
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557,
558 ( 1 989) (finding empirical support for the attitudinal model).
47. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7 (1 994) (detailing Southern resistance to the Brown decision); see also
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 25 (1998)
("Reaction to the Brown decision was swift. As Ric.hard Kluger recounts in his history of
Brown, while much of the press outside the South greeted it with enthusiasm, many South
erners were shocked and angered.").
48. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief" Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, 81
MICH. L. REV. 922, 924 (1983) (discussing notion that Chief Justice Warren's "achievement,
widely praised at the time, was not only in authoring the opinion that found state-imposed
segregation in public schools unconstitutional, but also - almost more important - in pull
ing together a unanimous Court for the result and the opinion"); Richard H. Pildes, Democ
racy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 307 (2000):
Giles [v. Harris] perhaps confirms the theory that "conformity of the law to the wishes of the
dominant power in the community was the fundamental tenet of [Holmes'] legal theory." . . .
that a judge must never "forget[ ) that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by
half his fellow men to be wrong."
See also Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the
Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979).
49. PERETTI, supra note 32, at 1 82:
Public and elite support is to a large extent conditioned on political agreement with the
Court's policy decisions. Thus, the Court must exercise political caution and be sufficiently
responsive or sensitive to public and elite opinion so as not to wake the sleeping lion . . . .
[W)hen the justices comr. from within the ranks of the political elite, the justices are more
likely to possess the knowledge to anticipate and the contacts to discover the political reac
tions to its decisions.
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difficult it will be for a judge to be certain, and in some cases judges
may miss the mark.50
None of this is to claim that judges do, or should, simply follow
popular opinion in rendering their decisions. We have already seen
that normative theory diverges on what judges should do. As indicated
above, if constitutionalism and judicial review have a place in our sys
tem of government, then there necessarily are some occasions on
which judges should deviate from popular views.
It is only to suggest that what we may have is a system of popular
constitutionalism. That is to say, most important decisions by the
Supreme Court fall within the mainstream of public opinion, and when
they do not the public supports the practice of judicial review none
theless. The mechanisms are neither perfect nor perfectly understood,
but the theory is plausible.
Of course, the relationship between public opinion and judicial
review necessarily is mediated. There are at least three ways in which
this is the case. First, judges are not elected, so popular control over
them is indirect. Second, the public necessarily expresses its views
regarding the maintenance of a system of judicial review through
elected representatives. Measures to enforce judicial decisions, or to
challenge judicial authority, come from those with the power to do so,
and it is those actors who are more or less accountable to the people.
Third, the public's understanding of what judges do is filtered, not
only through these representatives, but through the media and other
sources as well.
Understanding how this mediated system of popular constitution
alism works is important, for it bears upon normative arguments about
judicial review. If the empirical evidence offered here is correct, then
it is possible that frequent claims made by those in the legal academy
regarding the divergence of judicial review from popular opinion
simply are inapt. Similarly, the affirmative normative claim - that
judges strike laws consistent with the deeper held values of the people,
and that the people support this system - rests on empirical claims
that themselves require probing.
III. THE COUR T

'

S S LACK

As we have seen, the theory of mediated popular constitutionalism
rests heavily on at least one central empirical question: How tightly
See also RICHARD DA VIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRESS (1995) (providing evidence that the Supreme Court justices are attentive to media
coverage of the Court and its decisions).
50. Indeed, Mark Graber argues that with regard to some of the most contentious issues
of the time, political branches simply foist these controversies off on the j udiciary. See Mark
Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 35 (1993); see also TUSHNET, supra note 1 1 , at 149-50.
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does public opinion constrain judicial autonomy? This question might
be asked in various ways, but basically it is whether public sentiment
will demand judicial decisions that mirror popular preferences, or
whether the public will tolerate (or prefers) greater judicial autonomy.
Will judges, or a judiciary, that strays from public opinion necessarily
be brought to book?
This question is central to most normative views about judicial ,
review, because although judicial outcomes often mirror public opin
ion, this does not mean they always do. The importance to normative
theory is in understanding what consequences follow when divergence
occurs. Those who applaud the judiciary's countermajoritarian role
will hope courts can act independently with impunity. On the other
hand, if the judiciary's independence is seen as a threat to democratic
values, popular constitutionalists will be reassured if a Court that
strays from popular opinion is likely to be brought back into the fold
rather quickly.
For all its importance, this is the question regarding the interaction
between public opinion and judicial review that is perhaps the most
difficult to get at. It requires careful theoretical specification, presents
awkward problems of measurement, and ultimately implicates a
related and equally troublesome question about how the public even
monitors the judiciary. But for all the difficulty, social scientists have
provided a framework and at least several steps toward answers.51
A.

The Theory of Diffuse Support

For at least the last forty years, social scientists have thought about
the relationship between the work product of institutions and popular
support for those institutions. The question is of obvious importance
to democratic government. In a democracy, the people, individually as
well as collectively, will not necessarily be pleased at all times with the
work of their institutions. But will support for those institutions persist
even during times when institutional output is displeasing? As David
Easton, whose work in this area is seminal, explained:

5 1 . It bears stressing that although the work discussed here offers interesting insight into
the question of public support for judicial review, the conclusions should not be accepted
without an understanding of the work's strengths and weaknesses. There is a wide body of
work in the social sciences that bears upon constitutional theory, see Barry Friedman, The
Politics of Judicial Review (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), which is just be
ginning to get well-deserved attention. But like any body of scholarship, that work has diffi
culties, of which legal scholars relying upon it should be aware. Some of the problematic as
pects are reviewed in Barry Friedman, Modeling Judicial Review (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). The social science project of connecting public opinion and judicial re
view faces especially thorny obstacles, many of which are alluded to in the discussion that
follows. In addition, the project is still at a relatively early stage. With those caveats in mind,
that literature still has the potential to enhance the way normative scholars think about judi
cial review.
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Typically, members of a political system may find themselves opposed to
the political authorities, disquieted by their policies, dissatisfied with
their conditions of life and, where they have the opportunity, prepared to
throw the incumbents out of office. At times such conditions may lead to
fundamental political or social change. Yet at other times, in spite of
widespread discontent, there appears to be little loss of confidence in the
regime - the underlying order of political life - or of identification with
the political community. Political discontent is not always, or even usu
ally, the signal for basic political change.52

In order to get at this question of whether people will remain loyal
to institutions in the face of policy disagreement, Easton developed
the concepts of "specific" and "diffuse" support.s3 Specific support is
driven by agreement with particular policies, it is a measure of
whether a person thinks an institution is doing a good job in terms
of policy output. Diffuse support, on the other hand, "consists of a
'reservoir of favorable attitudes of good will that helps members to
accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of
which they see as damaging to their wants.' "s4
Despite the utility of the distinction, analysis is compounded by
numerous definitional and methodological difficulties that play off one
another. In order to measure support of these various types, one must
be able to define them with clarity, and once defined, identify ways of
getting at the two. This is no easy task because as one would expect, at
some point the two come together. In other words, intense enough
specific disagreement with an institution ultimately will have an
impact on diffuse support.ss
Applying these concepts to the work of constitutional courts is
even more difficult. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the
concept's coherence rests on the salience of institutions. "It assumes
that people are or can become aware of the political authorities those who are responsible for the day-to-day actions taken in the
name of the political system."s6 Second, it assumes the people can hold
the institutions accountable. "The relationship between felt wants and
articulate demands must be such that the members can lay the blame
or praise at the door of authorities, such as given legislators or the
legislature. "s7 Both of these assumptions are problematic with regard

52. David Easton, A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Popular Support, 5 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 435, 436 (1975).
53. Id. at 436-37.
54. Id. at 444 (quoting DAVI D EASTON, A SYSTEM OF ANALYSIS 273 (1965)).
55. Easton recognized the possibility, although he felt it could be overcome: "Empiri
cally they may well shade into each other at some point; but, except at the margins, their dif
ferences really ought to be visible." Easton, supra note 52, at 448.
56. Id. at 437.
57. Id. at 438.
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to judicial review. As we shall see, the work of courts is not particu
larly salient. And as we have discussed, unlike elected representatives,
no notion of constitutional judging has at its core the idea that if
dissatisfied with decisions the people will simply toss the bums out of
office.
The difficulties of applying these concepts to constitutional courts
may explain why just over a decade ago, Greg Caldeira could say "The
truth is, we know virtually nothing systematically about the effect of
public opinion on the Supreme Court."58 Yet, the lack of knowledge
poses serious problems for theorizing about judicial review.59 Jonathan .
Caspar put the point bluntly: "Many normative assumptions and
prescriptive propositions about the role of the Supreme Court in
American society rest in part upon implicit and untested empirical
assertions about public attitudes toward the Court."60
B.

Diffuse Support and the Supreme Court

Yet, Caldeira - speaking in 1 990
was too modest, because
shortly thereafter he and frequent coauthor James Gibson took what
may still be the largest stride toward understanding the relationship
between public opinion and the Supreme Court, The Etiology of
Public Support for the Supreme Court.61 Beset by problems of meth- '
odology and available data, Caldeira and Gibson nonetheless
managed to come at the distinction between specific and diffuse sup
port for the Supreme Court in a way that offered some hope of getting
a handle on the question whether people would support the Court
despite disagreement with individual Court decisions. In particular,
they thought to ask questions of people that identify precisely what we
should care about when assessing diffuse support, such as whether
judicial review should be maintained despite unsatisfactory decisions,
and whether punitive measure like jurisdiction stripping should be
employed.62 Against this they measured specific support as a function
-

58. Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS 303,
313 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1990) (hereinafter Caldeira, Courts and Pub
lic Opinion] .
59. It is important t o recall that the issues here apply not only t o federal courts but to
state courts as well, and that unlike the federal judiciary, the selection and retention systems
for state court judges are a work in progress. See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 1 91 -226 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry
Friedman eds., 2002).
60. Jonathan D. Casper, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court: Introductory Remarks,
84 NW. U. L. REV. 983 (1983).
61 . Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Su
preme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 639-64 (1 992).
62. Id. at 639-41 (discussing the way in which they measured diffuse support with a set of
items that concerns willingness to accept fundamental structural changes in the institution).
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of whether respondents felt the Court's decisions were too conserva
tive or too liberal.63
Caldeira and Gibson found - in Easton's apt phrase - a "reser
voir of support" for the Court that transcended sentiment about the
specific job that the Court was doing.64 Indeed, diffuse support held up
as an independent measure of public sentiment about the Court, even
when they controlled for numerous other variables - including such
things as demographic characteristics or policy preferences on topics
like abortion or racial segregation - that might ·be thought to influ
ence it.65
Perhaps the most telling finding was the measure that did correlate
moderately with diffuse support. Caldeira and Gibson asked respon
dents a series of questions that juxtaposed order against liberty, and
that inquired about respect for what they call democratic values, but
more properly may be thought of as respect for minority rights. As
one might expect, those who favored liberty over order, and were
more tolerant of political rights of minorities, were more likely to
show diffuse support for the Supreme Court than those who did not.66
C.

Specific Support Shading into Diffuse Support

Despite the advance of Caldeira and Gibson, the lurking problem
with their analysis was the permeable barrier between diffuse and
specific support. Because, as Caldeira recognizes, the output of courts
is of low salience,67 it is possible that to not know about what the
courts do is to love them. Indeed, scholars - including Caldeira have made just this claim: that diffuse support for courts is highest the
less people know about what courts are doing.68
63. Id. at 642 ("We measured specific support by asking the respondents whether the
Supreme Court is 'too liberal or too conservative or about right in its decisions?' )
"

.

64. Id. at 658:
[T]he mass public does not seem to condition its basic loyalty toward the Court as an institu
tion upon the satisfaction of demands for particular policies or ideological positions. . . . Dif
fuse support for the Supreme Court among the mass public is, rather, associated with basic
facets of individuals such as political values. . . . Diffuse support truly does consist of a reser
voir of goodwill and commitment among the mass public.
65. Id. at 651 .
66. Id. at 653.
67. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, supra note 58, at 303 ("This bit of political
trivia [that more people could identify Judge Wapner than the chief justice] illustrates one
facet of the Supreme Court's and other court's [sic] ambivalent place in the eyes of the
American public: lack of saliency in all but few situations."); see also PERETII, supra note 32,
at 167 ("Clearly the Supreme Court lacks salience for most Americans. Its members are
quite unfamiliar to them and, especially significant, 'many . . . Supreme Court decisions pass
by virtually unnoticed by most Americans.' ").
68. PERETII, supra note 32, at 1 81 -82 ("The lesson is simply that should t�e Court per
sistently issue decisions that are patently and substantially out of sync with dominant public
opinion and the dominant political leadership, the Court can and will be brought to heel . . . .
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There is, both in the work of Caldeira and Gibson and in the many
studies that have followed in their wake, plenty of evidence that the
barrier between specific and diffuse support is breached in important
situations.69 Coming to understand when this is so, and for what
groups, is of great importance to normative perspectives on judicial
review. If diffuse support is nothing but an artifact of ignorance, then
sunshine might bring the two together. But if diffuse support endures
even when the public is acquainted with the work of courts, then we
are in a different normative ballpark altogether.
One telling breach is in the differing views between what might be
called "opinion leaders" or elites, and the rest of the public. Caldeira
and Gibson found in their early study that for many of what they
called "opinion leaders" "diffuse support behaves as if it were specific
support. "70 In other words, "for many of the opinion leaders support
for the high bench is contingent upon satisfactory judicial policies."71
Caldeira and Gibson's definition of an "opinion leader" was shaky it was basically self-defined72 - but other studies have demonstrated
the same. Numerous studies suggest that among elites, the politically
active, whatever one might call them, " [s]upport for the Court . . . [is]
also very closely correlated with their approval of specific court deci
sions. "73
Perhaps the most telling evidence that to know the Court is to
assess it realistically is found in a project by Charles Franklin and

[Yet,] given public inattention, divisions, and ambiguities in public and elite opinion, and
structural fragmentation, the Court enjoys considerable room in which to maneuver in its
policymaking endeavors."); Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, supra note 58, at 325-26:
So long as the justices maintain a low profile and policies reinforce expectations, basic politi
cal values will shape attitudes toward the Supreme Court. Eventually the Supreme Court up
sets expectations, creates controversy, and becomes a more salient target. Some members of
the public will come to see a disjuncture between expectations and performance. Diffuse
support will therefore weaken, and views toward the court wilt reflect opinions on matters of
policy more directly. Accordingly, basic inclinations toward the Court will play a smaller role
in the structuring of current views.
69. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text. As Chief Justice Taft once confided to
his brother:
As I see the history of the Court, almost every year something has to be decided that arouses
one section or faction or part of the country against the Court, but generally this is neutral
ized by some decision in the near future in favor of that section or against some other.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (May 7, 1922) (available in THE PAPERS
OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFr, Library of Congress), quoted in Walter F. Murphy & Joseph
Tannenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 985, 993 (1990).
70. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 61, at 656.
71. Id. at 656.
72. Id. at 655.
73. David Ada many & Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as a National
Policy Maker, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 405, 408 (1983).
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Liane Kosaki involving public awareness of the Supreme Court.74 At
the conclusion of the study, Franklin and Kosaki correlated the senti
ment of people toward the Supreme Court with two factors: their
conservativism, and their information about what the Court was
actually doing. The data were from 1989, a time when those in the
know would rate the Rehnquist Court as increasingly conservative.
What Franklin and Kosaki found was stunning. Unknowing liberals
rated the Court more favorably than unknowing conservatives,
whereas as information about the Court increased, responses came
much more closely into line with the Court's actual political stance.
Thus, unknowing conservatives would rate the Court below 50 on a
"feeling thermometer," while unknowing liberals would rate the Court
just above it. Yet, among the most fully informed, conservatives rated
the Court well over 75, while liberals dropped below 50.75 Depending
upon what the Court is doing, to know the Court may well be to love
or hate it. Diffuse support might evaporate.
Similarly, there is evidence that when members of the public care
about what the Court is doing, specific support is more likely to merge
into diffuse support. Caldeira and Gibson noticed that positions on
abortion rights tended to correlate with diffuse support, suggesting
this is a hot-button issue that could affect diffuse support for the
Court.76 Adamany and Grossman found this as well - liberal political
activists that were less likely to support the Court did so perhaps
because of the Court's then support for abortion rights.77 Valerie
Hoekstra conducted a study, the hypothesis of which was that people
most likely to be aware of or influenced by Court decisions would
have stronger views about the Court.78 She tested this by measuring
popular reaction to the Court in geographical areas that gave rise to
controversies before the Court, and then measured awareness and
response to Court decisions as one moved outside those areas.
Although she was not measuring diffuse support, her results showed
74. Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations
of the Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352-75 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
75. Id. at 371 ("Among the quarter of the population least likely to know about the
Court decisions, liberals are more approving of the Court, whereas conservatives are more
disapproving. . . . As we move up the level of awareness of the Court, this pattern re
verses.").
76. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 61, at 644 ("[T]hose who would permit women to
have an abortion under any circumstances . . . show significantly more support for the Su
preme Court.").
77. Adamany and Grossman, supra note 73, at 423-24:
Opinion about abortion has been gradually shifting toward support for the Court. In 1969,
prior to the Supreme Court's decision, abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy was
opposed by a margin of 50% to 40% . . . . Subsequent surveys showed a growing majority fa
voring a woman's right to obtain an abortion, at least under certain circumstances.
78. Valerie J. Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Local Public Opinion, 94 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 89, 97-100 (2000).
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that geographical proximity increased awareness, and that those who
knew what the Court was doing tended to change their views of the
Court on this basis. 79
One of the most persistent pieces of evidence suggesting that one's
views of actual decisions influences actual support for the institution is
the longstanding and significant divergence among racial groups in
their reaction to the Court. Since their very first study, Caldeira and
Gibson have documented a significant disparity, in that African
Americans were less supportive of the Supreme Court than
non-African Americans.80 In some sense this disparity seemed to be
one regarding diffuse support, but on examination matters were more
complex. It turns out that there is a generational division of opinion .
among African Americans. Exposure to the work of the Warren Court .
had a lasting and profound effect on any particular African Ameri
can's support for the Court. Those who were so exposed tended to
support the Court more than those whose consciousness about the
Court was formed either before or after that era.81 In other words, it
appears that views about judicial review were formed in response to
specific events, but that those views then persisted for a long period of
time.
Taken together this evidence suggests we need to know something
about how informed the public is regarding the work of the Supreme
Court, and how obdurate feelings about the Court are once formed. If
feelings are obdurate and salience is low, then diffuse support may be
nothing other than an artifact of these elements, albeit an enduring
one. Whether this will matter from a normative perspective would
then depend upon whether salience could be increased.
D.

Information and the Court

Scholars are uniform in their assessment that the salience of
the output of courts is low. As Caldeira points out: " [T)he Supreme
79. Id. at 97 ("In addition to geographic proximity, awareness is affected by education,
gender, attention to the media, and the frequency of political discussions. . . . Furthermore,
there is evidence that satisfaction with those decisions influences subsequent evaluations of
the Court.").
80. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 61 , at 640 ("[B]lacks show substantially less support
for the Court than do whites."); James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S.
Presidential Election of2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535,
543 (2003) [hereinafter Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election
of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?] ("Black Americans are considerably less
likely than whites to express loyalty toward the Court."); James L. Gibson & Gregory A.
Caldeira, Blacks and the United States Supreme Court: Models of Diffuse Support, 54 J. POL.
1 1 20, 1 140 (1 992) ("[B]lacks are on balance fairly positive toward the Court, but they are
decidedly less positive than whites.").
81 . Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 61 , at 640 n.7 ("We explain a significant portion of
the persistent support among blacks for the Court as a residue of positive affect [sic.]created
during the era of the Warren Court.").·
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Court and other courts [ . . . ] lack saliency in all but few situations."82
Obviously this holds less true for the Supreme Court, but even here
the mill run j udicial decision attracts little public attention.
The public is not as unknowing about the Supreme Court as we
sometimes are led to believe.83 It was vogue for a while to point out
that more Americans could identify Judge Wapner from the People's
Court than the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
William Rehnquist.84 Yet, Caldeira, Gibson, and Spence tested public
knowledge about the Court and found Americans know more than
that factoid would suggest. Most knew the Court contained a woman
and an African American, and most could identify who each of those
were from a list. They also knew some basic facts such as how justices
are chosen. Perhaps most amusing (and telling) for present purposes,
the authors scored as a correct answer - and most people got this
correct - the fact that the Supreme Court has the final say as to the
meaning of the Constitution.85
What people know obviously is based upon how they get their
information. People learn about decisions of the Supreme Court the
same way they learn about most things: from the media, and from the
statements of public opinion leaders.86 That simple but apparent point
explains the bandied factoid. Judge Wapner spends a lot more time on
television and in the media than Chief Justice Rehnquist. If the
Supreme Court opened its doors to cameras, Rehnquist's household
recognition likely would go up several points.
Just how salient are Supreme Court decisions? How much does the
public know about Court decisions, and what does it take to educate
them?87 Franklin and Kosaki endeavored to determine how much
82. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, supra note 58, at 303.
83. James L. Gibson et al., Public Knowledge of the United States Supreme Court 1
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (hereinafter Gibson et al., Public Knowledge
of the United States Supreme Court].
84. See supra note 67; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIG HT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE 39 (1998); The Washington 100, NAT'L J., June 14, 1997, at 1 169 (results of a poll
showing that low-level officials were included in Washington's 100 most important people
while Chief Justice Rehnquist was not); WASH. POST (Weekly Edition), June 26-July 2,
1989.
85. Gibson et al., Public Knowledge of the United States Supreme Court, supra note 83,
at 1 ("Nearly 80% of the respondents rightly responded that at least one of the justices is
black and that at least one of the justices is female; over 60% say that the Supreme Court
has the ultimate 'say' on the Constitution.").
86. Benjamin I. Page et al., What Moves Public Opinion?, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23,
(1987) (finding that public opinion is influenced very much by television commentary, next
by the President's views, positive or negative as public views the President); see also JERRY
W. SANDERS, PEDDLERS OF CRISIS: THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER AND THE
POLITICS OF CONTAINMENT (1983) (analyzing the impact of "experts," as different from
news commentary, on public opinion).
87. These are questions that Charles Franklin and Liane Kosaki set out to answer in
their excellent study, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the Supreme Court.
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media attention is necessary in order to capture public awareness of
Supreme Court decisions. They chose a limited area - St. Louis and measured the amount of coverage the Court received, and public
awareness, at various points in time. Their time frame was 1989, when
the Court handed down 144 decisions, only one-quarter of which
received any network coverage, and just over ten percent (sixteen
cases) of which were covered on all three networks.88
What is immediately telling about the Franklin and Kosaki study is
how few decisions of the Supreme Court are likely to make it into the
public awareness in any way.89 The authors followed public awareness
of five cases handed down at the end of the Supreme Court's Term.
Those five cases were Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,'XI an
abortion case in which the Court might have overruled or significantly
restricted Roe v. Wade,91 the flag-burning decision, Texas v. Johnson,92
a major affirmative action case, Martin v. Wilks,93 the dial-a-porn
decision, Sable Communications v. FCC,94 and the case involving the
death penalty for minors, Stanford v. Kentucky.95 The authors
measured media coverage for these cases, and interviewed respon
dents about awareness of the decisions. From this data the authors
then estimated a model of likely public awareness of Supreme Court
decisions.96
The model that Franklin and Kosaki derived from their interviews
suggests that only a small fraction of Supreme Court decisions are
likely to make it into the public consciousness. According to their
Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 74. Further evidence, generally supportive, is found in
Hoekstra, supra note 78.
88. One unfortunate thing about the Franklin & Kosaki study is that they did not meas
ure local news coverage, particularly because one of their cases - Webster - involved a
local story. Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 74, at 355-56 ("For the media coverage, we
collected all stories carried by the local daily newspaper . . . and the national television
network news. We did not collect data on local television notes."). Hoekstra's study demon
strates that local news covers local cases more, increasing awareness and popular reaction to
the Court. See Hoekstra, supra note 78, at 99-100.
89. Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 74, at 357-58:
[C ] onsider the probability that an average citizen goes for a week without seeing any stories
about each of the branches of government. For the president and Congress, the probability
of not seeing a story in a week is about 1 percent. For the Court, the probability of not see
ing a story is 39 percent. Put simply, citizens are virtually guaranteed to see stories about the
president and Congress. It is far more likely that a citizen will miss the few stories that ap
pear about the Court.

90. 492 U.S. 490 (1999).
91. 410 U.S. 1 1 3 (1973).
92. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
93. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
94. 492 U.S. 1 1 5 (1989).
95. 492 U.S. 361 (1999).
96. Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 74, at 355.
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model of public awareness, only Webster and Texas v. Johnson were
likely to be noticed and recalled by respondents.97 On the other hand,
these two decisions achieved very high probabilities of likely aware
ness.98
Two different characteristics account for awareness: public atten
tion to the cases, and characteristics of individuals who might be
following public information or debate.99 It is not only media coverage
that matters. There are groups of people - for example those inter
ested in politics or newspaper readers - who are likely to have more
information. And certain cases have greater interest for certain indi
viduals, like the abortion decisions for women.100
Even with regard to public coverage there are different patterns, as
evidenced by the abortion and flag-burning controversies. The abor
tion case was covered immediately in a sharp burst of coverage that
boosted likely public awareness quite high. The flag-burning decision,
on the other hand, lay relatively dormant until President Bush began
to make an issue of it about a week later, at which time coverage and
the likely probability of awareness shot up.101
What the Franklin and Kosaki study leads us to conclude is that
only a small fraction of the Supreme Court's work is likely to be
salient with the public, absent some other influence to hold the
decisions in the public light. Only a small number of the cases attract
the sort of media attention that cause them to stick in the public
consciousness. It is important to understand, however, that public offi
cials can bring media light on decisions, raising their visibility.

97. Id. at 358 ("The abortion and flag-burning cases received the highest coverage, from
three to seven times as much as the other three cases. The three less visible cases, received
little coverage, making it much more likely that citizens would fail to hear of these deci
sions.").
98. Id. at 366 ("[T]he flag-burning and abortion cases show that it is possible for large
proportions of the public to be aware of some Court decisions. . . . The median probability
for the flag case is 0.75, whereas for the abortion case it is 0.88 . . . . This demonstrates that
when a case becomes highly visible, as the abortion and flag cases, public awareness can be
come very high."). "Likely" refers to the fact that the authors measured both coverage and
actual awareness of survey respondents, then estimated awareness across the geographic
population.
99. Id. at 361.
100. Id. at 366 ("The most important conclusion is that there is substantial variation in
awareness of Supreme Court decisions, both from case to case and across individuals."); see
Adamany & Grossman, supra note 73, at 423 ("In the 1970s, both blacks and whites told
pollsters that they favored desegregation, but the highly visible j udicial remedy of school
busing was opposed by 82% of whites and also by 33% of blacks."); accord. Caldeira & Gib
son, supra note 61, at 645 (showing that the same variation exists for residential racial segre
gation and legalization of marijuana cases).
101. Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 74, at 360.
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The Nature and Obduracy of Public Reaction

It matters not only what the public learns about the Court, but how
that information affects public opinion about judicial review generally.
Answering this question has proven to be extremely difficult. There
are basically two axes that require examination. First, how does
information affect public opinion? Second, how long-lasting are the
views so formed?
One might reasonably assume that Court decisions engender pro
ponents and opponents, and this is generally the case. The "Warren
Court" effect among African Americans is a good example of positive
reaction engendering long-term support for the Supreme Court. 102
Studies similarly document negative reaction to decisions lowering
confidence in the Supreme Court.103
In certain ways, however, reaction to Supreme Court decisions is
asymmetrical. Exactly how is unclear. Some studies show negative
reaction being more intense than positive, or outlasting positive,104 and
some studies suggest the opposite.105 The question is whether these
seemingly conflicting results can be reconciled.
It seems fairly clear that Supreme Court decisions can polarize
public opinion, and that the most important reaction may actually be a
form of entrenchment on the merits or even backlash. Franklin and
Kosaki performed another study to try to get at whether the Supreme
Court's decisions can motivate public opinion in the substantive direc
tion of the Court's decision.106 They tested what several legal commen
tators have speculated is the "educative" function of the Supreme
Court, that is, the capacity of the Court to influence public opinion in
a positive way on the merits. What they found was quite the opposite.
Studying the impact of an abortion decision, Franklin and Kosaki
found that the decision tended to reinforce sentiments against
abortion, especially among those most likely to be in groups that
shared an opposing position.107 In fact, they found evidence to support
102. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 61, at 640; Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 80, at
1134-35.
103. Anke Grosskopf & Jeffery J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme
Court Decisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence
in the Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 633 (1998) (showing that disagreement with one or
both decisions of the Court, on Webster and Texas v. Johnson cases, substantially reduced
confidence in the Court); Hoekstra, supra note 78, at 97 (showing that satisfaction or dissat
isfaction with the decisions made by the Court influences subsequent evaluations of the
Court).
104. See infra notes 1 10-119.
105. See infra notes 1 10-1 19.
106. Charles H . Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S.
Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 763-69 (1989).
107. Id. at 759 ("[N]onwhites and Catholics became substantially more opposed to dis
cretionary abortion in the aftermath of Roe."); see id. at 767:
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their speculation that what occurs is that members of these groups
reinforce one another's views, casting them more sharply than those
without group influence.108 This evidence of polarization comports
with Michael Klarman's well-developed "backlash" thesis about
Supreme Court decisions, that is, that their most significant impact is
to embolden the forces that oppose the Court on the merits.109
Of course, opinions on the merits are not the same thing as opin
ions about the Supreme Court. It is entirely possible to disagree with
the Supreme Court in a case or cases, and nonetheless continue to
support the institution of judicial review. This, after all, is what the
diffuse-support thesis is all about.
Yet, there is also some evidence to suggest that negative reaction
to a decision influences views about the Supreme Court more than
positive reaction. Quite different studies by Durr, Martin, and
Wolbrecht,110 and by Grosskopf and Mondak,1 1 1 provide some evi
dence that those whose ideological views depart from the Court's either over a range of decisions in the case of the first study, or in reac
tion to specific decisions in the case of the second - translate those
feelings more strongly into a reaction to the Court generally than
those whose reactions are positive.1 12
I f the public homogenously favors the Court's position prior to the ruling, support will rise
across all groups. Similarly, if the populace was uniformly opposed to the Court's position
beforehand, support will actually decrease in the aftermath. In both cases, the mechanism is
the same: individuals are moving in the direction of their (homogenous) social context.

108: Id. at 765 (showing that interaction among churchgoers support one another's
views, hence "high-attendance Catholics were more strongly opposed to abortions for health
than lower-attendance Catholics").
109. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7, 85-129 (1994) (describing the Brown backlash thesis); see also Michael J.
Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111,
1182 (2001 ):

Supreme Court rulings often produce unpredictable backlash effects. In the same way that
Brown mobilized southern whites to resist further changes in the racial status quo, and Roe
v. Wade inspired right-to-lifers to organize politically against abortion, McCulloch v. Mary
land may well have mobilized a states' rights opposition to the nationalist principles articu
lated by the Marshall Court.
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure,
REV. 48, 96 (2000):

99

MICH. L.

[D]ecisions such as Powell v. Alabama produced notable backlashes in southern white
opinion. The more the Supreme Court intervened on behalf of the Scottsboro Boys, the
more determined white Alabamians seemed to execute them. Similarly, the Mississippi Su
preme Court clearly retrogressed in Brown v. Mississippi, refusing to reverse a conviction
based on a coerced confession that it almost certainly would have excluded from evidence a
decade earlier.

110. Robert H. Durr et al., Ideological Divergence and Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 768 (2000).
111.
1 12.

Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 103.

Durr et al., supra note 1 10, at 774 (explaining that "extreme divergence between
the ideological positions of the Supreme Court and the public, maintained over time, causes
Court support to erode to nearly the all-time observed low, with potential consequences for
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On the other hand, Caldeira and Gibson refer repeatedly to a
"positivity" bias in reactions to the Supreme Court. 1 13 By this they
mean just the opposite, i.e., that positive reaction to the Supreme
Court matters more than negative reaction. One example of this is,
again, the longstanding positive feelings that African Americans influ
enced by the Warren Court held about the Court, feelings that
persisted despite strong subsequent evidence that the Court was not
particularly friendly toward African Americans.1 14
If there is resolution to these divergent positions, it probably has to
do with the span of time over which public reaction to the Supreme
Court is measured. The Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht study suggests
the negative feelings have a fairly short half-life.1 15 The study attempts
to model how ideological divergence will affect public support for the
Court over the long haul, with the conclusion that negative reaction is
not likely to have a significant effect absent a series of Court decisions
over some sustained period of time that diverge from public senti
ment.116 The New Deal period comes immediately to mind. Similarly,
it is important to distinguish what sort of public reaction is being
tested. The Grosskopf and Mondak measure was "confidence" in the
Court,117 which really is more a measure of specific than diffuse
the legitimacy of the institution"). Grosskopf and Mondak, supra note 103, at 652, argue that
" [r]espondents who agreed with both the abortion and the flag-burning decisions gave the
Court minimal credit, but people who disagreed with one or both edicts reacted more
strongly against the Court in response." Favorable response to the Court rulings is, in itself,
likely to be insufficient to offset the damage inflicted by too many high-salience unpopular
decisions. See id.
1 13. See James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 343, 352 ( 1998) [hereinafter Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National
High Courts] ("We can conclude that awareness is correlated with diffuse support but is
generally mediated by the effect of satisfaction . . . . People become satisfied with the court's
policy outputs by being aware of its policies. This lends support to the positivity bias
hypothesis, which is well known in the political psychology literature."); Gibson et al., The
Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Other
wise?, supra note 80, at 555:
]T]he Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore did not have a debilitating impact on the
legitimacy of the US Supreme Court. Perhaps because the Court enjoyed such a deep reser
voir of good will, most Americans were predisposed to view the Court's involvement as
appropriate, and therefore dissatisfaction with the outcome did not poison attitudes toward
the institution.
1 14. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 61, at 645 (explaining the positive attitude among
black Americans who experienced the era of the Warren Court); see also Gibson & Caldeira,
supra note 80, at 1 1 34-35.
1 1 5. Durr et al. show that the "aggregate Court support responds to public evaluations
of Court behavior, but for various reasons, the impact of temporary shocks is relatively
short-lived." Durr et al., supra note 1 10, at 774. "In two years the system returns to its equi
librium." Id.
1 1 6. Id. at 774.
1 17. See Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 103, at 641 (using the question "As far as the
people in charge of running the Supreme Court are concerned, would you say you have a
great deal of confidence, only some, or hardly any confidence at all in them?").
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support.1 18 On the other hand, Caldeira and Gibson and coauthors
consistently have tested whether the public would support fundamen
tal change regarding the Court, the best measure of diffuse support.119
On balance then, what seems to be the case, is that over time the
Court somehow builds up a store of diffuse support, which is not easily
eliminated by negative reaction to individual decisionsY0 How this is
so is not entirely clear. There is another Caldeira and Gibson study
(this one with Baird) that tries to answer this question by studying
public reaction to a yariety of national high cotirts.121 This is their
clever way to get at the absence of longitudinal data (survey data over
time) about the Supreme Court. The data gathered in the national
high-courts study is difficult to interpret; even the authors' specula
tions about the data runs in numerous directions.122 Nonetheless,
trying to peer through the clouds, that data suggests the possibility
that high courts make friends and enemies with decisions, that over
time they build up a store of friends whose positive feelings linger, that
this translates into diffuse support, and that it takes a great deal of
negative reaction to displace this fundamental support once a court
has managed to establish itself.123
F.

But Is There Really Diffuse Support? Bush v. Gore Says Yes!

All of this begins to provide a coherent, if not full, picture of public
support, except with what seems to be one large problem with the
1 18. James L. Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme
Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 355 (2003) (finding that "confidence" is more a measure of
"short-term satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the Court, rather than an
enduring loyalty toward the institution itself').
1 19. Id. at 361-63 (discussing better measures of "legitimacy" of the Supreme Court,
including loyalty as expressed by willingness to support fundamental change to the institu
tion).
120. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, supra note 1 13, at 356
("The acquisition of support is a dynamic process . . . . It appears that satisfaction slowly
evolves into institutional legitimacy, and the degree of connection between specific and dif
fuse support is contingent upon the institution's age.").
121. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, supra note 1 13.
122. Id. at 348. The study also faces some conceptual problems. In some countries it is
not clear which institution is the high Court. For instance, the French Supreme Court cannot
exercise judicial review, while the Conseil Constitutionel - not a typical court - engages in
a priori judicial review. In addition, the courts of different countries also differ in "political
age," and on the formal powers they possess.
123. Id. at 355:
Older courts, on balance, tend to be more legitimate, and they tend to have more accumu
lated specific support, which more readily translates into institutional legitimacy. Not much
of . . . this relationship is linear; . . . . Specifically, there is a remarkable difference in the
strength of the correlation between specific support and legitimacy depending on the institu
tion's age. The courts are easily divided into two groups: nine younger than thirty years and
eleven older than that. Among the former, the correlation between specific and diffuse sup
port is .29; among the latter it is .72.
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diffuse support thesis. That problem is that although in their many
studies Gibson and Caldeira ask the right questions about diffuse
support, such as whether one would support jurisdiction stripping or
the elimination of judicial review, how reliable are those answers?
After all, this is not a question people are likely to have thought about,
and one might surmise that if such fundamental change were really on
the agenda the matter would get a great deal of sober reflection.
Indeed, the problem with studying diffuse support is a metaphor for
the idea itself: Would people adhere to their answers after being
subject to intense public debate on the matter? This problem is
compounded by the information about court salience. If the work of
courts is not terribly salient in the first place, people are even less
likely to have given this matter any thought.
As it happens, however, history provided something in the way of
an experiment, or perhaps an improvement in Gibson and Caldeira's
own ability to conduct survey testing of the diffuse-support thesis. The
presidential election of 2000 went famously awry in Florida, it went on
for a long time, it was in and out of courts, it got lots of attention,
people had strong feelings, and it got resolved by the Supreme
Court.124 Salience there was aplenty, as well as much commentary
about the proper role of judicial review.
The Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence study of public opinion after
Bush v. Gore125 provides strong evidence for the diffuse-support
hypothesis.126 As one might have anticipated, partisanship influenced
views of the decision, not only its fairness but whether respondents
believed it was decided on the basis of law or the judges' political
preferences;127 the racial effect continued to surface;128 and those who

1 24. The controversial 2000 election spawned countless academic responses. See, e.g. ,
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000 (200 1 ); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED (2001); RICHARD
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK (2001 ); THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 2001); Michael J . Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional
History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001).
125. 5 1 3 U.S. 98 (2000).
126. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000:
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, supra note 80. For a review of more immediate re
sponse to the Bush v. Gore decision, see Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on
Public Perceptions and Knowledge ofthe Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32 (2001).
127. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000:
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, supra note 80, at 549 ("[P]arty identification is a strong
predictor of the perceived fairness of the decision in Bush v. Gore.").
128. Id. at 543 ("Substantial racial differences in opinions toward the Court existed in
1987 and persisted in 2001 . Black Americans are considerably less likely than whites to ex
press loyalty towards the Court. . . . ).
"
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disagreed with the decision felt more strongly than those who
agreed.129
Yet, despite huge opposition to the decision, Gibson et al.
conclude that diffuse support for the Supreme Court remains high.130
Overall, the decision in Bush v. Gore had absolutely no negative
impact on levels of diffuse support. Indeed, in comparison to similar
studies in 1987 and 1995, those levels had increased. This was true
despite the fact that probably as a function of. Bush v. Gore's salience,
the number of "don't knows" had dropped (this was true even among
Democrats).13 1
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT
The question is where all this learning regarding public support for
the judiciary leaves normative theories of judicial review. Section
IV.A offers some thoughts on that issue. But as Section IV.B goes on
to emphasize, public opinion is, and can be, influenced. Ultimately the
ways of influencing j udicial review may bear heavily on how norma
tive theories hold up.
A. Normativity and Public Support
The question of how public support bears upon normative theories
of judicial review really needs to be addressed in two stages. First,
there is the question of how we should think about public support
assuming that the work of the Supreme Court is of sufficient salience
to justify thinking anything. Then, we should think about the implica
tions of low salience.
To the extent the public is sufficiently informed, the implications
of the diffuse-support hypothesis cut heavily in favor of normative
theories resting on judicial independence, and against those who criti
cize the Court as having strayed from popular views (including as to
constitutional meaning). That is to say, the public apparently remains
satisfied with the practice of judicial review, even if this means letting
judges go their own way, so long as there are bounds to judicial discre
tion. As the Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht model suggests, the store of
"capital" that the Court possesses is not infinite.132 But then, it is also

129. Id. at 546 ("Those who disagreed with the decision are more likely to feel strongly
about it than those who supported the outcome.").
130. Id. at 555 ("(W)e have shown that the Supreme Court decision in Bush
not have a debilitating impact on the legitimacy of the US Supreme Court.").

v.

Gore did

131. Id. at 554 ("In 2001 46.6 per cent of the Democrats gave two supportive replies to
our questions; in 1 987, this figure was insignificantly lower (43.0 per cent).").
132. See Durr et al., supra note 110, at 774 ("[E)xtreme divergence between ideological
positions of the Supreme Court and the public, maintained over time, causes Court support
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not a matter of direct expenditure.133 The store of capital is not spent
with every unpopular opinion. The public seems to understand the
Court's independent job, and cuts it a certain amount of slack.
This bodes well for those who envision a countermajoritarian role
for the Court. It indicates that the public will tolerate the Court play
ing this role, within bounds. The Court can act contrary to popular
preference
Bush v. Gore suggests resoundingly so - and still find a
reservoir of public support. Those bounds likely are not unlimited,
however, and as we will see, public opinion is subject to some
manipulation by those who take an interest in doing so.
Of course, recognizing a certain amount of judicial independence
says absolutely nothing about the normative desirability of the Court's
agenda. The Supreme Court was viewed as having acted in counter
majoritarian fashion during the Lochner era and the Warren Court.134
If this is correct, a court can be countermajoritarian from wildly dif
ferent political perspectives. When you choose to have an
independent court, that's what you get.
It is more difficult to know what the slack accorded the Supreme
Court means for popular constitutionalists, because their demands are
less clear. Critics from the right (think Bork, and the abortion issue )135
and the left (think of the wealth of scholarship about the recent feder
alism decisions) have assailed the Court for acting contrary to popular
will. It is not at all clear that these critics are correct empirically, which
is to say that perhaps they have gauged public opinion incorrectly.136 If
-

to erode to nearly the all-time observed low, with potential consequences for the legitimacy
of the institution.").
133. See id. ("[O]ur results provide empirical support for the premise that aggregate
Court support responds to public evaluations of Court behavior, but for various reasons, the
impact of temporary shocks is relatively short-lived."); see also BICKEL, supra note 3, ch. 6
(discussing how the decision of the Supreme Court in the segregation cases was simultane
ously costly among some constituents and profitable among others).
134. Those events are summarized in Barry Friedman, The History of the Counterma
joritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1438-47
(2001), and Friedman, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, supra note 18, at 215
(describing how countermajoritarian criticism was heard at times when this characteristic
was apt).
135. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
136. See Charles H. Cameron, Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell It When You
See It? And, Who Cares, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, ch. 6 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002)
(surveying literature asking whether judicial review contributes over time to liberal democ
racy and concluding that we simply do not know the answer); Mark Graber, Constitutional
Politics and Constitutional Theory, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 209, 320-22 (taking grand con
stitutional theorists to task for insufficient attention to empirical reality); see also Chemerin
sky, Losing Faith, supra note 27, at 1423-25 (describing how Tushnet ignores matters like
lower court decisions that fall below the attention of the Supreme Court); Friedman, The
Cycles of Constitutional Scholarship, supra note 8.
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that is so, then there is no shortfall between public sentiment and judi
cial outcomes.
Even if the Court has diverged from public opinion as to the
merits, or constitutional meaning, the implication of the diffuse
support theory is that the public still might prefer to accord interpre
tive authority to the Supreme Court regarding constitutional meaning.
Think again about the large majority in the Gibson, Caldeira, and
Spence study of public knowledge who said the Supreme Court has
final authority to say what the Constitution means.137 If people think
this, and if they oppose fundamental change to the system even as they
disapprove of individual decisions or the ideological trend of the
Court, then a popular - and indeed fairly longstanding - view is that
the Court has interpretive authority over constitutional meaning.
B.

Influencing Public Support

There is a big "if" here, however: public opinion is not exogenous
to the system of judicial review and commentary about it. Public
opinion can be influenced. Indeed, the Supreme Court likely influ
ences public opinion quite a bit, whether intentionally or unintention
ally. Thus, the real question is where public opinion would rest if
actors involved in the process of creating public opinion did so more
self-consciously.138 In order to think about this, it is useful to consider
various ways in which - given what we know about salience and
how the public gets its information - the Supreme Court's practices
actually influence (or fail to influence) popular opinion.
First, and perhaps foremost, the Court's scheduling practices keep
it off the public radar except in rare bursts. The Court hands down
most of its decisions in a fairly compressed period of time, and typi
cally many of the most controversial come down in the last couple of
weeks in the term. The Franklin and Kosaki study of media coverage
shows how the Court receives basically very low media attention com
pared with the other branches of government, the exceptions being a
large blip in late June (when the high-profile cases typically are
decided), and a somewhat smaller one when the Court begins its new
term in October.139 Recall also that negative opinion has a fairly short

137. Gibson et al., Public Knowledge of the United States Supreme Court, supra note
83, at 5.
138. See Jose Maria Maravall, Accountability and Manipulation, in DEMOCRACY,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATION 154-96 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999) (dis
cussing the ways in which politicians seek not only to influence public opinion but also what
they do to hide their actions from public scrutiny).
139. Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 74, at 356-57 ("The Court's coverage peaks in June,
when major decisions tend to be handed down. There is also a modest upturn in coverage
when the Court begins its term in October.").
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half-life. 140 Thus, the practices of opinion release keep the Court out of
the news more than it is in it.
Second, the public cannot possibly follow the actual content of
opinions, and largely knows about opinions simply what the media or
opinion leaders tell them. This means that sometimes the public gets
the headline and misses the story. Think, in this regard, about the
decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.141 The headline the public
received was that the Supreme Court had not overturned Roe v.
Wade.142 The reality is that following Casey courts started to uphold
laws bearing negatively on the ability of women to obtain abortions.143
It could be that the public is content with both halves of this story. But
it also is possible that the public only received information the first
half.
Third, the public cannot even follow the headlines when the
subject matter is obscure enough. Much of what has aroused academic
and progressive ire of late are the Court's federalism decisions,
particularly those involving congressional power to subject states to
remedial suits.144 This is difficult stuff to teach even law students. So

140. Durr et al., supra note 1 10, at 774.
141. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
142. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Linda Greenhouse, High Court, 5-4, Affirms
.
Right to Abortion but Allows Most of Pennsylvania 's Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at
Al; Ruth Marcus, 5-4 Court Declines to Overrule Roe; But Limits Permitted On Abortion,
WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at Al; Laurence H. Tribe, Write Roe Into Law, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 1992, at Al 7.
1 43. See, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (upholding physician-only re
quirement); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (uphold
ing broad exception to the confidentiality requirement of Arizona provision on judicial by
pass of parental consent); Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri & E. Kan., Inc. v. Dempsey,
167 F.3d 458 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding Missouri provision preventing abortion service pro
viders from receiving state family-planning funds).
.
144. See generally Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9, at 1054 ("Jn 1996, however, in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the increasingly confident new conservative majority created a
new state immunity, purportedly based on the Eleventh Amendment but in reality made up
out of whole cloth."); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing In
Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REV. 407, 487 (1999) ("By asserting a freestanding prerogative
to control its own subject-matter jurisdiction over lawsuits against state interests, this
Supreme Court has dealt itself a remarkable constitutional power, moving it a step beyond
Marbury."); Post & Siegel, supra note 1 1 , at 455 ("The Court's new interest in constraining
Section 5 power, when considered in light of the developments in Commerce Clause and
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence we have just discussed, raises disconcerting questions
for the future of federal antidiscrimination law."). The magnitude of the academic response
to these decisions is well demonstrated by the proliferation of symposia and conferences on
that topic. See, e.g., Symposium, Federalism after Alden, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631 (2000); Sym
posium, Shifting The Balance Of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, And State Sover
eign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (200 1 ); Symposium, Symposium on New Directions in
Federalism, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1275 (2000).
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long as the stories about the Court are told at a technical level, the
public is going to switch to the next channel or turn the page.145
Closely related, and perhaps most important, is the issue of salient
decisions. As we have seen, only a small fraction of what the Court
does is likely to register with the public. 146 Thus, a strategic Court
easily could accomplish a great deal while hiding behind salient deci
sions. The ability to do this can be overstated; it is not as though the
Court always can determine in advance which stories will be news.
Nonetheless, it does not take prescience to figure out that certain
cases will be the high-profile ones, and an awful lot can take place be
hind the scenes, relying on more obscure doctrines.
Take one final example, this time of something the Court has not
done. There long has been a call for the Supreme Court to open its
doors to cameras for oral arguments.147 This the Court has opposed.148
It is possible that the Court's opposition is ill-placed. There are hints
in the literature that what creates diffuse support is the "trappings" of

145. Covering the Supreme Court for the New York Times, Linda Greenhouse has
made a noble effort to explain the Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions in a catchy way.
See, e.g. , Linda Greenhouse, 5-to-4, Now and Forever; At the Court, Dissent Over States'
Rights Is Now War, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 4, at 3 ("There are dissenting opinions at the
Supreme Court, and then there are declarations of war. These days, federalism means
war."); Linda Greenhouse, Legacy of a Term - A Special Report; In Supreme Court's Deci
sions, A Clear Voice, and a Murmur, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1996, at Al ("Continuing a search
ing, and divisive, re-examination of the allocation of Federal and state power that it began
the previous year, the Supreme Court sharply curbed the authority of Congress to subject
states to lawsuits in Federal courts."); Linda Greenhouse, States are Given New Legal Shield
by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at A l ("Thrusting the doctrine of state sover
eignty well beyond existing boundaries, the Supreme Court placed sharp new curbs today on
the ability of Congress to make Federal law binding on the states.").
146. Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 74.
147. See, e.g., Cameras Belong in U.S. Courts, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.),
Mar. 8, 2003, at 18A; Court's Vigor on Display, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2000, at M4 ("Friday's
hearing should, however, settle the question of whether cameras and audio recorders belong
in the high court."); Let TV be a Window to Courts, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at M4
("American Bar Assn. President Philip S. Anderson declared last week, 'I cannot think of a
better civics lesson for the people of America than to be able to see and hear every argu
ment before the Supreme Court of the United States.' He is right."); Televising the Highest
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at A28 ("The chief justice should embrace the presence of
television in the United States Supreme Court as an important tool of democratic
empowerment."); Television and the Court, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 27, 2000, at A16
("(The Supreme Court) should follow the lead of most state courts and regularly televise its
sessions.").

148. Court's Vigor on Display, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2000, at M4 ("With most of the jus
tices harboring deep antipathy toward the idea of cameras or recorders in the courtroom,
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist last Monday summarily rejected a CNN request to
broadcast this session."); Open up the Courts to Cameras, the Public, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar.
16, 1998, at B6 ( 'The day you see a camera come into our courtroom it's going to roll over
my dead body,' Souter snarled."); Television and the Court, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 27,
2000, at A16 ("C-SPAN and other networks have long sought the court's permission to take
their cameras inside. They have been repeatedly rebuffed.").
"
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power.149 If this is the case, public viewing of oral arguments might
enhance diffuse support. On the other hand, the Court may be wise to
be wary. If in fact less information is better (for the Court), then tele
vising arguments is a risk. It is no surprise that the Court declines to
take the risk, and chooses not to permit televised arguments.
That is the Court's side of things, but there is room on the opinion
leader and media side to play the same game. Recall that this entire
discussion about the public takes into account the fact that the public
is removed from the Court. The public's influence on the Court is
mediated, and the reverse is true as well. In between sit political actors
who have direct power over the Court, and influence over public
opinion.
In some sense the mediated nature of the public's influence on the
Court might protect the Court. Even assuming an angry public, it is
possible that those in power will seek to protect the Court when the
chips are down. Such sentiments need not be widespread. It is a lot
more difficult to take action against the Court than to protect it, there
are numerous "veto gates" where legislation that might affect the
Court could be stopped. 1 50
But should the Court stray, it is more likely that the possibility of
inserting opinion leaders and politicians between the public and the
Court presents an opportunity to muster public opinion. First, recall
that for opinion leaders, diffuse support acts like specific support. In
other words, those in power tend to react much more directly to
specific decisions.151 This makes perfect sense; those in power stay
there by having their agendas adopted. For those in power, judicial
review can pose a real problem. Second, politicians make their names
by acting as policy entrepreneurs, by alerting the public to issues that

149. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000:
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, supra note 80, a t 553:
When Courts become salient, people become exposed to the symbolic trappings of judicial
power. . . . No matter how one judges the outcome in Bush v. Gore, exposure to the legiti
mizing symbols of law and courts is perhaps the dominant process at play. Thus, the effect of
displeasure with a particular decision may be muted by contact with these legitimizing sym
bols.
See also Gregory Casey, The Supreme Court and Myth: An Empirical Investigation, 8
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 385, 409 (1974) (discussing the mythology of neutrality and objectivity
in judicial decisionmaking). But see Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, supra note 58, at
325 ("So long as the justices maintain a low profile and policies reinforce expectations, basic
political values will shape attitudes toward the Supreme Court.").
150. See Friedman, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part //, supra note 44, at 45 '
(2002), for an elaboration of this. See generally McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 720-21 (1992) (providing
discussion of veto gates).
151. Adamany & Grossman, supra note 73, at 408 ("Support for the Court among these
[political) elites [political) is . . . very closely correlated with their approval of specific court
decisions."); Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 61, at 656.
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call out for attention.152 It is difficult to imagine that if there is a prob
lem with the Court, if the Court has strayed, somebody will not step in
and fill the gap by making hay about the Court's present direction.
That said, two caveats are in order. One is the lesson learned pain
fully by Franklin Roosevelt. Diffuse support does exist; one attacks
the Court at one's peril. For another - and this is something that
progressive academics discontent with the present Court ought to
learn from their conservative cousins - how one says things matters.
The conservatives have been clever; the progressives in all their
frustration have not. Conservatives figured out that it was easier to
attack individual judges than the institution of j udicial review,153 and
that successful attacks depended on spinning stories the right way.
Progressives spend their time railing at the Court, and doing so in a
fairly technical way unlikely to capture public attention. 154
V.

CONCLUSION

Public opinion and judicial review are connected. From a norma
tive position they probably should be. But that connection is at a
distance, it is mediated. There is a certain amount of slack between
public support for the Supreme Court, and its views about what
the Court does. That is probably a good and important thing. Even
popular constitutionalism is, and must be, something other than the
satisfaction of immediate political desires. But the slack is not endless,
152. See generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, A vailability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).
153. For instance, John Ashcroft held a series of hearings on judicial activism, Judicial
A ctivism Defining the Problem and Its Impact: Hearings on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 10 (1997), stating:
[W]e . . . heard testimony from individuals who have experienced the impact of j udicial ac
tivism firsthand. I don't think any of us who were here could forget the testimony of Detec
tive Pat Boyle, who told us how his son was killed by a dangerous criminal who was out on
the street because of a Federal court order issued by a judge who, I believe was inappropri
ately j udicially active. Detective Boyle's testimony demonstrates that the problem of judicial
activism is not some theoretical concern about the separation of powers alone, but a prob
lem with sometimes tragic, real-world consequences. Today's hearings will help to demon
strate other ways in which activist judges and their decisions have affected all of us.

Stephan 0. Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing Congressional A ttacks on the Third
Branch, 87 KY. L.J. 679, 726 (1999) (quoting then-Senator Ashcroft); see also id. a t 706-08
(presenting remarks of Senator Dole at a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Edi
tors, asking "Do we really want the majority of judges on the Federal bench to think like
Judges Barkett, Baer, Brinkema, and Sarokin - an all-star team of liberal leniency judges who seem intent on dismantling the rule of law from the bench"); id. at 709 (present
ing statement of Senator Hatch, "Judge Sarokin has repeatedly come down on the side of
criminals and prisoners in a series of cases and he recently voted to overturn the death sen
tences of two Delaware men who, in separate cases, killed several elderly people"); id. at 714
(reflecting views of Tom DeLay favoring the impeachment of "activist" judges such as Wil
liam Justice, Fred Biery, Harold Baer, Thelton Henderson, and John T. Nixon).
154. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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nor is it fixed. It is a function of how informed the public is, and how it
is informed. This ensures - for better or for worse - that diffuse
support is not static.

